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Abstract
Recent scientific studies indicate that atmospheric emissions
of certain chlorofluorocarbon compounds (CFCs) contribute to
depletion of the ozone layer which protects the earth from harm
ful ultra violet radiation.

Since late 1978, the use of these

compounds as aerosol propellants has been banned in the United
8tates.(43 FR 11301-11326).

Since then, the use of CFCe in

other product areas has risen dramatically.

With this in mind,

the Environmental Protection Agency has suggested that further
regulation of CFC use may be necessary.
EPA 1s considering two major approaches to further

eFe

emissions control: a mandatory controle approach and an
economic incentives approach.

This study focuses on the latter,

analyzing a hoat of regulatory approaches which are based on
economic incentives.

The analysis is aided by the use of a

computer simulation which models future CFC demand.

Using the

model, the costs of purSUing various regulation strategies are
oompared.

Further, this report examines how these coeta increase

if regUlation is delayed for a few years.
MinimiZing the cost of reduction is only part of the
problem.

Therefore. thls study addresses the political and

administrative aspects of implementing various control strategies.
Conclusions and recommendations are drawn from an analysis incor
porating all these aspects.
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I.

IN~RODUCTION

Background
Recent scientific studies indicate that atmospheric emissions
of certain chlorofluorocarbon compounds (CFCs) contribute to
depletion of the ozone layer which protects the earth from harm
ful ultraviolet radiation.

Since late 1978, the use of these

compounds as aerosol propellants has been banned in the United
1

States.

Since then, the use of CFCs in other product areas has

risen dramatically.

With this in mind, the Environmental Pro

tection Agency has suggested that fUrther regulation of CFe use
may be necessary.

This report examines various regUlatory

schemes designed to reduce emissions from nonaerosol applications
and assesses the economic implications of eaoh scheme.
The

Re6~atory

Problem

The 1978 ban on CFC use as an aerosol propellant was su.ccess
ful in that eFe use was reduced with little disruption to the
economy.

CFC users found that they could eas1ly use alternative

propellants or even manual pumps to drive their product out of
Its container.

These alternatives prOVided inexpensive yet

effective means to meet consumer demands.

In other product areas

such substitution may not be as easy.
Further reduction of CFC emissions will come with increasing
cost and sacrifice to our soc1ety_

However, the regulatory meth

odology need not be overly burdensome.

Additional regulation

should be cost effective, easy to implement and po11tically fea
sible.

Unfortunately, it 1s not clear Which regulatory approach

optimally combines these three traits.
I

43 FR 11301-11326, March 17. 1978.

It 1s therefore necessary

2

to examine and evaluate many control strategies to determine
which one provides the best solution under present circumstances.
OVerview of

~

Paper

This paper examlnes various regulatory strategies to reduce

eFe use.

It concentrates on a little used. but potentially very

effective, mechanism for instituting control. namely economic
incentives.
The study analyzes a host of regulatory approaches which are
based on economic incentives.

The analysis 1s aided by the use

of a computer simulation which models future CFC demand.

Using

the model. the costs of purSUing various regulatory strategies
are compared.

Further. we examine how these costs increase if

regulation is delayed for a tew years.
Minimizing the cost of reduction is only part of the problem.
Therefore, this study addresses the political and administrative
aspects of implementing various control strategies.

Conclusions

and reco:;mendatlons are drawn from an analysis incorporating all

these a.spects.

II.

Ca.uses

~

Effects

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
~t

Ozone Depletion

Ozone (03) 1s an unstable, highly reactive gas which does
not, perstst 1n the lower atmosphere, or troposphere, except in
those regions affected by photochemical smog.

However. in the

upper atmosphere (stratosphere), at altitudes between 10 and

50 kilometers, ozone can and does exist naturally.
accumUlation 1s

k~own

as the ozone shield.

This natural

3
This shield protects the earth from damaging ultraviolet
radiation (DUV).

It exists in dynamic equilibrium, with ozone

constantly being destroyed and created.

Many things can affect

this equilibrium including nitrogen oxides, bromine compounds
and CFCs.
CFCe are inert gaseous chemicals at the earth's surface.

Onder conditions present 1n the upper atmosphere. these compounds
break down to form reactive species.

In this form. CFCs may

catalytically react with ozone resulting 1n ita destruction.
Scientific evidence now suggests that emissions of these
chemicals from industrial processes may work their way up to
the stratosphere where they can attack the ozone shield.

The

consequences of this attack can be divided into three categoriesl
1. human health effects,

2. climatic effects, and

3. miscellaneous

2

other effects.
Moet important among

t:l:»-,huU~:beal th

effects are three types

of skin cancer resulting from increased DUV lavels.

They are

basal-cell cancer (non-melanoma). squamous cell Cancer (noo-melanoma)
and melanoma.

Other human heal th effects in-clud·fj1 sunburn and

various eye disturbances. such as

photoke~atitis

photophob1a, lacrimatioo. and blepharospasm.

of the cornea,

The precise relation

of those latter effects to ozone depletion haa not yet been fully
established.
The climatic effects include changes in temperature and
precipitation.

CFCe released into the atmosphere absorb infrared

radiat1on, both to and from the earth's surface resulting in atmos
pheriC:: warming or what ha.s been called a "greenhouee l1 effect.
This Bame effect 1! purported to cause a rise in precipitation.

2

Ds'nnis J. Snower. "An AnalySis of optimal, Dynamic Standards for
C)·zone-Shield Management" t from _a ~eQort based on the CFC Conference
at port Depoait, Marylana. July 197~, p. ll~5.

-4
As CFCs work their way up into the stratosphere, where they
participate 1n ozone destruction, they-:caue8 a reduction of atrat
ospheric absorption of solar energy.

This. in turn. causes a

reduction in surface temperature and precipitation.

This effect

1e expected to be sma.ller than the CFC induced tlgreenhouee" effect;
thus it 1s most probable that slight atmospheric warming will
occur.

Thle induced temperature increase, however, 1s expected

to be smaller than the. t under the famed carbon dioxide "greenhouse"

H

effect.
Nevertheless. CFC induced climatic changes can have major
impacts.

These would be most readily ssen in agricultural pro

duction.

However. not all agricultural producte will be affected

1n the Bame way; for example, corn production would Buffer with
increased temperature and precipitation. while cotton and rica
3
production would benefit from theB6 same changes.
The miscellaneous other effects of ozone depletion include
materials weathering and varioue biological effects.

The latter

effects include the development of cancer 1n animals, such a8
cattle and other domestic herds.

Also. genetic material in plants

and marine 11fe may be hurt by the increase in damaging ultraviolet
radiation.
Sources
The initial threat from CFC use aroae from its USB as an
aeroBol propellant.

In this capacity, CFCe provided an 1nex

pensive and effective means to prop.l a fine mist ot deodorant,

3

Kelejia.n, H. and Vavrichek, B. ItPollution, the Ozone Layer. and the
Economic Cost of Concerning Crops" ,unpublished paper presented at
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Conference on Ozone Protection,
port Deposit. Maryland, JUly 1918.
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furniture polish, cooking oil, etc. out of a container.

Later

its use was extended to shaving creams and other foam products.
In late 1978, under a joint effort by the Environmental protec
tion Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, all these uses
4
were banned.
Only BO called "essentla.lll aerosol uBee, auch as
those used to propel insecticides used in food production, were
left untouched.
It 1s estimated that this ban reduced CFC use by roughly
5
50 percent in the United States.
This reduction, however, haa
been temporary.

It has nearly been

:Off&e~

of CFC usage in nonaero8ol applications.

by the rapid growth

Nonaeroeol CFC uee has

been rising dramatically.

If left unregulated, total CFC use will
6
almost double between 1980 and 1990.
Nonaerosol uses of CFCB extend to many product areas.

CFCs

are used to manufacture flexible foams used in products such a8
furniture, bedding and carpet underlay, and to make rigid foam
inSUlation for buildings and refrigeration devices.

other CFC

foams are used for packaging foods (e.g. egg cartons and " s tyrofoam ll
coffee cups).

CFCs are the

r~

rigerants in automotive air con

dltloning, home refrigerators and freezers, commercial air con
dltlonlng systems, and display and storage cases for retail food
4

43 FR 11301. March 17, 1978.
5

My estimation basad on Table 9-1 in Peter Bohm's "Protecting the
Ozone Layer: The Cass of Controlling Refrigerant Uses of CFMB II
presented at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Conference on
Ozone protection, Port Deposit, Maryland. July 1978, p. 9-2.
6
RA~~ Corporation, Economic Imnl1catlons of Re ulatin
Chlorofluoro
carbon Emissions from Nonpropellant Applications. Santa Monica, CA,
June 1980) p. 266.

-6

stores.

CFC solvents are used to clean and dry metals and .1ec

tronice components and also to dry clean clothing.

CFCs are

also sometimes used to sterilize medical equipment, to stabilize
whipped deesert toppings. or to provide gas pressure to operate
boat horne and other warning devioes.

These CFCs are known by

such trade names as Freon, R-12, and F-ll.
Today, CFC related businesses are worth about $500 million
and employ about 780,000 workers.

At present growth levels,

these businesses will be worth nearly tl billion in 1990.

Any

CFC regulation will affect 260,000 businesses in CFC related
industries.

7

Ozone (a Global Good) and CFC (a Global Pollutant)
The ozone shield provides a textbook example of a pure
l

public good.

This shield provides protection on a global scale.

Any change in the ozone shield will affect everyone (thOUgh ad
mittedly not equally).
CFC emission provIdes a perfect example of a negative exter
nality.

CFCs released in the production and use of goode do not

individually affect the producer or user of the good.

These

effects are distributed over the entire population of the world.
Moreover, it does not matter where the emitters are

locat~d.

The

damage depends solely on the aggregate volume of residuals emitted.
The· atm08pheric mixing process will d1etrl bute emissions globally

7

These are figures of the nascent Alliance for Responslble CFC
presented in Chemical. and Engln~~rJLqg News, 59:9, March 2.

~ollcy

198], p.8 ..
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with no concentrated effects near emitters.

Thus CFC is a

8

global pollutant.

eFe

uee 1e widely distributed.

The United States 1e the

largest producer and user of CFCs. accounting for more than. a
third of all CFCs used (Table I).

Any unilateral action of the

Un1ted States toward control will have greater impact than the
single actions of any other nation.
Table 1& World Chlorofluorocarbon

pr'odu~tlon

and Uee 1n 1917

Nation

Percent of World Total
Use
frOductlon

United States

35.8

39.0

EEC·

30.2

39.1

Japan

6.5

7.3

27.5
100.0

14.6
100.0

Others"
Source:

EPA Analysis, Federal Register. 1980. Vol. 45. No. 196.
p. 66728.

• European Economic Community manufacturers of CFCs in decreasing
order: West Germany, France. Great Britain. ItalY and the
Netherlands.
_. Other world manufacturers are in decreasing order: the
Communist Bloc. Canada, Australia, Spain, Mexico, Argentina,
Brazil. South Africa. India. Iarael. Greece, and Venezuela.

An

Intertemporal_ Perspact1V8J ,_ The CFC Bank and .A.tmpspheric Mixing
Though CFC emissions may seemingly represent a simple global

pollutant, complications arlse when the dimension of time 1s
introduced.

Any regulatory action (or inaction) taken today

will result in environmental changes far 1n the future.

8

This

For further discussion of global pollutants and their distinction
from local pollutants, Bse Tietenberg liThe Quasi-Optimal Price of
Undspletable Externalities: Comment, It The Bell Journal of Economics
( Spring, 1978); pp. 281-91.
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ariBBB from two effects.

First, not all CFCs used in a year are

emitted.

Some products are made by confining the CFCs in the

product.

These confined CFCe may be emitted slowly over time

or may be ret5ined until the product ruptures. perhaps at the
time of disposal.

This is particularly true for such product.

a8 refrigerators, air conditioners and freezers.

Tabla II showe

predicted USB and emissions figures by industry for 1976 and

1990.
This etoTe of CFCs inside products is called the CFC IIbank".
This 1s contra.sted with what is referred to as "promptl/ emissions,
9
i.e. emissions that occur as 800n a8 the CFC is first used. Table
III shows the predicted cumulative bank of CFCs In 1976 and 1990.
These figures estimate that with no regulat10n, the 1990 bank of
CFCs will be almost 2 billion pounds.

Unless regulatory stepe are

taken, these banked CFCs will continue to leak into the atmosphere
well Into the future.
and ozone destruction.

9

RAND 1980. p. 7.

This augments the t1me lag between CFC use

I

-9
Table II: Estimated eFe Usa and Emissions from Nonaeroeo1 Applications
(Excluding CFC-22). 1976 and 1990*
(Millions of pounds)

1976
Analyzed Applications

Use

1990

Emissions

Use

Emissions

Flexible foam

34

34

72

72

Solvents

69

69

147

147

Rigid foams
Urethane
Nonurethane

37
23

14
19

159

67

59
54

Moblle.air condl tlonlng

90

76

125

122

13

12

20

17

6
11

5
10

10

9

7
9

Other refrigeration
Chillers
Home refrigerators
and freezers
Retail tood devices
Miscellaneous
L1qu1d Fast FreeZing
Sterl1ants
Other

Total
Other applications

6

13
4

306

51

6

13

15

15

4

15

40
9

262

679

551

51-*

40

47

47**

-Calculations were performed from data provided by industry and
published sources. Annual use does not necessarily equal annual
emisslons because some CFOs are banked 1n f1nal products and
released slowly over time.
-.Although some of the products in this category may bank the
CFC, estimated emissions figures assume all CFCs are promptly
emi tted.

Source: RAND 1980. p. 6.
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Table 111& Estimated Size of the CFC Bank in 1976 and 1990
(Excluding CFC-22)
CFC Bank
(millions of 1b)
Product Area

1976

1990

Rigid foame
Urethane
Nonurethane

230
20

1,156
135

Mobile air conditioning

222

384

59

89
104

Other refrigeration
Chillers
Homa refrigerators and freezere
Retail food store devices

86
56

Total

673

81
1,949

Source: RAND 1980, p. 8.

Secondly, atmospheric processes take time.
on earth travel slowly to the ozone layer.

CFCs released

According to the

National Academy of Sciences (NAB), this atmospheric mixing
procese takes several decades.

lO

rhle further lengthens the time

lag between CFC use and ozone destruction.
From these two effects, we arrive at the problem of
intergenerational equity.
affect future generations.

The decisions of this generation will
This problem will be addressed

several times throughout this report.

10
National Academy of Sciences, Protectlon ~ain~t Depletion of
.strato,Bfherlc Ozone by Chlorofluorocarbons. (December, 1919,
WashIng on,

D.C.'.

-11III.

The Regulatory Alternatives

The Choices
Traditionally, pollution control 1n the United states has
relied on mandatory controls.
exception.

As

Oate~

CFC regulatlon to date 1s no

and Strassman point out, the

~PA

strategy has

to date merely distinguished lfessential'· from "non-essential" uses
and simply banned the latter.

Thus EPA's 1978 ban on CFC use

outlaws the least essential CFC application, 1.e. its use as an
aeroBol propellant.

They also point out that further distinction

between permlssable and non-permi6sable uses will become increasingly
subtle, and 1n the end control mandates will probably be rather
11
arbitrary.
Such difficulties motivate the searoh for different control
strategies.

One such alternative receiVing muoh attention in the

literature and one which EPA is increasingly turning to is the
12
use of economic incentives to control pollution.
Many economists advocate the idea of incorporating market
incentives into pollution control.

This support results from

a number of important properties 1nherent in a pricing solution.
For example, subject to some qualifications, a system of affluent
11

Wallace Oates and Diana Strassman, liThe Effectiveness of Effluent
Charges where 'Industry' structure Var1es,1I unpublished paper pre
sented at the E.P.A. Conference on Ozone Protection, Port Deposit,
Maryland, July 1978.
12
Thomas Tletenbers, "Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control
of Stationary Source Air Pollution. A Survey and Synthesis", Land
Economics, 56 (November 1980) pp. 391-416.

fees can show to result 1n the least-cost pattern of abatement
among polluters.

13

This is also true for alternative pricing

schemes such as the issue of marketable

~pol1ution

permits. 11

14

These economic incentives take advantage of the profit motive:
by making pollution costly (or conversely. pollution control
profitable). the regulatory authority can keep pollution down to
an acceptable leval.

Or, as Oates and Strassman point out, rather

than trying to ecforce a Bet of controls which polluters have an
incentive to avoid, the regulatory authority can enlist the aid
of market inducements to make pollution reduction directly pro
fltable to individual firms and consumers.

15

For CFCe. the use of these schemes will relieve EPA of the
burden of deciding which CFC usee are essentiali market forces
will automatically accomplish this.

EPA need only concern itself

With instituting market incentives which reduce emissions to"an
acceptable level.

All deoisions concerning where and how to cut

back pollution emissions are left to individual firms.

Assuming

these firms are cost minimizers. each firm will Beek the least
cost method of control.
Several interesting and promising methods of introducing
market lncentives have bean developed.

13

Relevant systems include

w. B&umol and W. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Pollcy
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1915), Chapters
4 and 10.

14

Thomas Tietenberg (1980), pp. 391-416.

15

Oates and Strassman. p. 1.
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the use of a Pigovlan tax, or affluent fee on CFC emissions.
Alternatively, CFC "pollution permits" can be issued.

Still

another meane of control i6 the use of a CFC deposit scheme,
Blmlliar to the bottle deposits used to reoycle beverage containers.
This study will focua on the former two approaches because they
16
provide the most comprehensive control coverage.
The first step in instituting economic incentlY6s is the
establishment of a reduction goal.

The efficient level of

control equates the marginal soclal cost of control with the
marginal social benefit of control.

In other worde, CFC emissions

should be reduced to the point where further reductions cost
society more (1n terms of expenditures on pollution equipment and
forgone consumption) than the resulting benefits (in terms of
less cancer. greater agricultural yields, etc.).

Unfortunately,

with imperfect information this optimal level 1s difficult to
determine.

This issue has generated much controversy over hoW

muoh regUlation is needed and when it 1s needed.
For instance. EPA, relying on the 1979 National Academy of
Sciences reports, is committed to a short term production freeze
at current levels.

After establishing this cap, EPA plans to

lower the cap yearly until production is limited to 30 percent
17
of present levels.
On the other hand, the Alliance for Respon
sible CFC Use argues that the results of more intricate 1980
studies on ozone depletion raise questions about the validity of
the 1919 NAB reportsj therefore, they argue, eFC regUlation should
not be instituted at this time.

18

To this end, the Allianoe has

16

For an evaluation of a deposit scheme, see Peter Bohm, "Protecting
the Ozone Layer I the Caee of Controlling R8,:(~lgerant Usee of CFM I all,
unpublished paper presented at the EPA Conference on Ozone Protection,
Port Deposit, Maryland, July 1918, Chapter 9.

17

ltAlllance Fights Limits· on Chlorofluorocarbons, II Chemical and
Engineering News, 59:9 (March 2, 1981), p. 8.
18

-14

been lobbying Congress to prevent regulation.

They have been

sucoessful in getting legislat10n introduced 1n both houses.

In the Senate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D.-Texas) has introduced
8. 517 and in the House, Representative Thomas A. Luken (D.-Ohio)
haa introduced H.R. 1853.

Both billS, if passed, amend the Clean

Air Act to provide tor more research on the ozone layer and stratos
phere.

The bills also prohibit, for the time being, any more eFC

regulation by EPA.
Other studies have been conducted which attempt to use
coat/benefit analysis to define the optimum level of control.
Because of uncertainties associated with the underlying data.
the beet these studies oan do is to identify a range of posslble
levels and, unfortunately, that range is quite large.

For instance,

the d l Arge-Smlth study concludes that the benefit-cost ratio
from banning production of F-ll and F-12, the moat heavily used

CPCs. may range from a low of 0.3 to a high of 5.86.

Similarly,

the Bailey study which examines the benefit-cost ratios of a complete
cessation of CFC emissions estimates a ratio of 0.42 althOUgh it
19
could range from 0.03 to 5.0.
Such inconclusive evidence complicates the decision making
process.

Clearly. more research 18 needed to determine even an

approximately optimal reduction goal.

This study addresses this

problsm by looking at sevaral reductions goals and then leaving
open the choice of a specific goal to the discretion of the regUlatory

19

These benefit/cost ratios are calculated by the author using
Martin Bailey·s benefit and cost estimations presented 1n "Costs
and Benefits of Chlorof'luoromethane ContrOl". unpUblished paper
presented at the EPA Conference on Ozone Protection, Port Deposit.
Maryland, JUly 1918. Chapter 6.
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authority.

Once this choice is made, whether it be optimal or

nonoptlmal, then a system of economic incentives can be institutea
which achieves this goal.
The Characteristics
The key to all economic incentive strategies used to reduce
CFC pollution 1s that they result 1n pigher eFC pricee.

This

induces firms to reduce CFC use In order to lower production coeta.
This can be accomplished by:
1.

substituting alternative chemicsls for crcs.

2.

purchasing equipment designed to recover and recycle
CFCs that would otherwise be emitted into the atmoa
peere.

3.

purchasing equipment that limits the rate at which
CFCa escape into the atmosphere.

This paper examinee three ways to raise effective erc prices:
levying pollution taxes, auctioning pollution permits, and allo
cating pollution permits.
A. eFC Pollution Taxes
eFC pollution taxes are excise taxes which must be paid
by users for each pound of CFC employed in a production process.
Like salee taxes, the eFC seller collects the tax and remits it
to the taxing authority.

Such a system raises the opportunity

coat of using a given quantity of CFCs by the amount of the tax.
Any user who reduces his

crc

purchases, reduces hie expenditures

by the amount of the tax as well aB the amount of the
price.

eFe

supply

ThUS, the cost savIng from reducing CFC uee 1s greater

than it would be without the tax, and techniques for controlling
use and emissions, become more profitable.

-16-

A tax is a very indirect method of pollution control.
any given tax, the regulatory agency doee not know how much

use will be cut back.

For

eFe

This depends on the marginal cost of pollu

tion control (MCPC) which, 1n turn, depends on the ease at which
firms can control p()llut,lon.
The MCPC 18 the additional cost of pollution control necessary
to cut back pollut1on one more unit.

If these costs are plotted

for various reduction goals we find that it results in an upward
sloping curve (Figure 1).

This 1e consistent with the view that

CFC use geta progrsf:s1vely more difficult to co'ntrol as more and

more reduction 1s needed_
Assuming firms are cost minimizers, ea,ch firm will cut back
CFC "lee to the pOlot

whe~e

the tax rate equals MCpe. .

eas11y shown ueing Figure 1.
tax rate
MCpe

marginal cost of pollution
control
(Firm A)

T

Q
I

This is

reduction units of CFC use

'igure 1. Effect of Pollution Tax (T) on Control
Decisions by Firm A.

Suppose EPA lest 1tutes a tax (T) on all CFC purchases.
l

Further,

suppose Firm A, in immediate response to this tax, reduce's

erc

purchases by Q1a It is now considering whether to further reduce
ita purchases or buy CFCs w1th the added tax.

After considering

all its optiona, it finds it can reduce CFC purchasBs by one more
un1t at a cost of PI-

Further, this control cost 1s les8 than the

-17-

tax T it must pay if it instead buye one unit of

C~C.

Therefore,

Firm A will opt for control rather tban purchasing a unit of
CFC.

In fact, it will find that control 1s its cheaper alternative

up to a reduction goal of Q*.

This 1e the point where MCPC equals

the tax rate.
Without adequate information on the MCPC, the regulatory
authority may have to resort to trial and error before finding
the proper tax rate (T-) Which will result in the desired reduc
tion (Q*) (Figure 2).

If the tax rate is too low (T ), firms will
L

still find marginal· erc use le'ss expensive than control techniques
and CFC use will not be reduced the desired amount.

Conversely,

if the tax rata is too high (TH), eFC use will be reduoed more
than the desired amount, imposing an undue burden on industry
(r1gure 2).
tax rate

Mepe

lf~GINAL

COST OF POLLUTION
CONTROL

T*

Q

Figure 2.

reduction units of CFC use

Effeot of Various Tax Rates on Reduction in
CFC Purohases.

Onoe this tax rate is properly adjusted. this aggregate
20

reduotion goal will be achieved at minimum abatement cost.

20

Baumol and Oates, Chapters 4 and 1.
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The rationale for this result i6 straightforward: any profit
maximizing firm will extend pollution control to the point
where the marginal cost of pollution control equals the emissions
tax.

Since all firms face this eame fee, the MCPC will be equal

for every firm.

Assuming increasing marginal costs. it follows

that there 1s no way to reallocate pollution reductions among
to reduce the total cost of pollution abatement.

firm~

Thus

pollution control costs are minimized.
Though a pollution tax results in a least cost pattern of
abatement among polluters, several complications arise when it
ie put into actual use.
account.

Rising prices will continually lower the effective

tax rate.
it

mu~t

First, inflation must be taken into

Therefore, to sustain a given tax rate in real t&rme.

be adjusted by Bome sort of price index.

Secondly, though we have demonstrated the existence of an
optl~l

tax. this does not imply that the regulatory authority

Can eaelly find the appropriate level of this tax.

For instance.

the Iltrial and error" process which is needed to adjust the tax
may cause CFC pricee to fluctuate significantly.

Such changes

could greatly complicate investment decisions for firma who are
deciding whether or not to bUy pollution control equipment.

To

eliminate these fluctuations, the regulatory agency would need
accurate information from all firms on the marginal cost ot pollu
tion control.

Such 1nformation gather1ng could indeed be costly.

For CFeB. EPA would have to solicit and proces8 information from
260,000 buslnesses, resulting in high administrative coste.

Aleo

the likelihood that this information would be correct 1s also very
small.

This Btrategy is therefore markedly different from a permit
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system (presented below); which needs very little information to
achieve a specific goal.
Thirdly, an optimal tax will vary over time.

These variation.

depend on, among other things, the level of economic activity and
the interest rate.

A full explanation and proof of this 1s pre

sented in Section IV.

For present purposes, it i8 important to

note that the levying of taxee works through a legal and political
process.

Because of this, tax rates arB often difficult to change

rendering tax Bchemes suboptimal.
Fourthly, if the tax rate necessary to achieve desired
reductions 1e very high, then CFC users will have to pay substan
tial taxes.

Firms unable to cope with these tax payments (either

by abeorb'lng the c08te or passing them to the consumer) may be
forced out of business, hence forcing people-out of work.

Such

possibilities must be accounted for when considering the political
feasibility of a tax eyetem.
There are, however, eeveral desirable characteristics of a
tax Bcheme.
suetain.

First of all, it 1s an easy system to initiate and

Since there are few CFC producers, the monitaring and

tax collection from CFC users could be accomplished at little
coat.
Secondly, though it may be difficult to change tax rates
over time to achieve optimal control, the administrative ease ot
a suboptimal system may make this system an
for control.

attractiv~

alternative

This 1s especially true if this suboptimal system

comes ClOS6 to the least cost solut1on.

-20

Thirdly, since the reduction goals are not yet precisely
defined. the fact that the tax scheme will not
goal is not very serious.

achi~ve

an explicit

However, by defining a reasonable tax

rate the regulator can insure that the

re~latory

process is

initiated without bankrupting the companies.
Most importantly, through the initiation of a tax the United
states could signal to the reat of the world that it thinks CFC
control 1s needed.

Th1s would hopefully stimulate research

efforts 1n other ceuntries while providing a framework for further
regulation in the United States.
B.

CFC Permit Auction Market
Under this strategy, the regulatory agency establishes an

explicit quota on CFC use and auctions orf shares (In the form
of CFC permits) of that quota to the highest bidder.

Through

this bidding mechanism, CFC pricss are raised indirectly.
A CFC permit is essentially a ration coupon authorizing
the user to purchas,e a sps"cifled amount of CFCs.

After making a

CFC purchase, the user must transmit to the seller the requisite
number of permits; the seller then turns the permits 1n to the
regUlatory authority to register completion of a CFe .ale.

The

regulatory authority can then monitor production and sales of
CFCs to assure that quota limite are met.
Unlike pollution taxes, the auctioning of CFC permits 18 &
direct method of CFC control.

Under this system, the regulatory

agElD'cy has complete author! ty over the quanti ty of CFCs which
firma

pur~se.

Through the bidding mechanism, firms can obtain
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the "r ight ll to use portions of this quota in their production
line.

Note that once the quantity of permits 1s fixed by the

regulator. the prioe of these permits is determined by the
firms themselves.

Thus, if aggregate CFC use 1s easily cut back

(i.e. if control options are relatively inexpensive) then the
equilibrium permit price will be low.

Likewise, if control

options are expensive firms will bid up the price of permits to
avoid control expenditures.
The contrQl decisions of individual firms are based on the
relationahlp between the price it must bid to obtain permits
and its marginal cost of pollution control.

Assuming CFC users

are cost minimizers, each will cut back CFC use to the point
where further permit expenditures equal the HCPC.

In other words,

each firm will employ those control options which are less expen
siva than permit purchases.
In this respect, an auction market is quite similar to a
tax Bcheme.

In both systems, firms control to the point where

marginal expenditures on control equal the effective price
of additional units of CFCB.

This implies that germit prices

and tax rates would be slm1liar for slml11ar degrees of control.
In fact, it can be proven that for the same reduction goal, the
21
price of the p~rmit equals the tax.
Whatever the reduction goal. the auotion market, like the tax
system, will achieve pollution reduction at min1mum abatement
cost.

Again, the rationale for this result is straightforward 1

21
Thomas

Tletenber~~

PollutLon C¢ntrol and thE Price System: A
unpuQlished Ph.D. dis8~r~&t1on
1971. p. 89.

Genera~_~g~11tbrlum Ana~Y81a, an
~t the-an1ver81~y ~~ Wisconsin,

-22-

any profit maximizing firm will extend pollution control to the
point where the marginal cost of pollution control equals the
permit price.

If this price 1s determined by competitive bidding.

then all firma will face the same price and the MCpe will be the
same for every firm.

Assuming increasing marginal costs, it

follows that there is no way to reallocate

poll~tion

reductions

among firma to reduce the total cost of pollution abatement.

.

pollution controle costs are minimized.

Thu!

22

Another dssirahle property of this system is that it 1s eelf
adjusting.

If we allow permits to be

transferable then firms

tnemeelvee can correct for over and under-purchases of permits

through buying and eelling practices on a permit after-market.
50 if firm A finds a Budden surge in the demand for its product
when no more permits are available from the government. it can
obtain permits from other firma on the permit aftermarket.

I~

Als bide are high enough, other firms will find it 10 their beet
interest to sell their permits and purchase more pollution control
equipment.

Thus production can be expanded without increasing

emiaslone.

In this respect, the permit system differs from the

tax syetem.

Under the tax system, an increase in demand for a

CFC generated product would, 1n the abeenee of further regulation,
also result in an increase in CFC emissions.
There are further dissimilarities between the auct10n market
and the tax scheme.

For example. as previously ment1oned, the

tax system results in quantity Qnc.rta1nty and the permit system

in coet uncertainty of pollution control.

Though the cost of

control 16 directly related to the quantity of control. the mag-

22
A more formal proof that permit systems are coat minimiZing is
presented in: David Montgomery. "Markets in L1c.ensea and Ef'flc1ent
Pollution Control Programs." Journ~ Of Economic Theory, 5 (1912)
p,p. 395-418.
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nitudes of these variables are dependent on outside forces such
as the demand for CFC generated products and the technological
progress of control technologies.

Therefore, if the regulator

controls the price of CFCs (as in the tax scheme) then the amount
of emission reduction is free to vary with these exogenous variables.
Likewise, if the regulator directly controls emission reduction
(as 1n the permit scheme), then the affective price of permits
is free to fluctuate with outside forces.
other dissimilarities between the systems include the ability
of the system to adjust to taxes.

Unlike a tax system. the pro

blem of inflation does not have to be addressed in the permit
strategy.

General price changes will automatically be included

1n permit bids from firms.
Also, unlike a tax. the problem of lntertemporal allocation
of control rssponsibility can be more easily addressed.

In the

disoussion of CFC taxes it was noted that the optimal tax varies
over time. these variations dependent on such things as the level
of economic activity and the interest rate.

Because taxes work

through a legal and political process they are difficult to adjust.
The permit system. however. can automatically respond to this problem.
By defining a permit quota in terms of cumulative emissions over

a time span of, say. ten years. the allocation of permits among
these ten years will be handled automatically by the market.

Profit

maximizing firms will weigh the value of CFCs used to produoe goods
(use value) against the value of CFCs saved for future use (asset
value).

By maximizing the sum of these two values firms will auto

23
matlcally allocate control responsibility over time.

23

This study does not offer a proof for this. but the analysis is
slmiliar to that involved 10 the theory of depletable resources in
which markete cause firms to efficiently balance these two values.
For further explanation on the theory of depletable resources, see
Baumol and Oates (l97S). Chapter 5.
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The most important distinction between the permit strategy
and tax scheme is the amount of information needed to contain

eFC use to a particular level.

Unlike the tax system, the

regulator needs very little information to establish its pro
duction cailing.

The regulator-: need only define !leafe" 11m! t.

of eFC usa below which there 18 negligable damage.
There are many draWbacks to the auction market, First, the
KPA must solicit bids from all CFC users.

Obtaining bids from

260,000 bueinesses will place a haa.y burden on EPA.
Secondly, EPA muet make sure that no firm gets a monopoly

aavantage.

1h1s situation must be ayoided to ensure a cost

effective allocation among firms.
or ollgopolletlc

.~t~a~lon

If some sort of monopolistic

1s established where a firm or group

of firms baa control of a large portion of the quota, these othe1r
firms may be forced out of business
their goals.

\

fro~-an

inability to produce

The competitive market structure 18 thus weakened.

But, as Tletenbel"g points out, noncompetitive marKets are a likely
24
problem only when the number of sellers is small.
of

crcs"

In the

C8S8

this will probably not be much of a Qroblem because

the potential holders of permits are very numerous.

Finally, like the tax system, an auction market will result
in 'transfers of weal th (this time in the form ot permit payments)
from CFC users to government.

. .

If these payments are substantial.

many firms may be forced out of business.

~tensive

plant closures

may torce, Jilany people out of work and ma.y impale the poll tical
~ea81b11ity

a4

or

the strategy.

Tietenberg (1980), p. 401.
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c.

CFC Permit Allocation Scheme
In order to 11ft the burden of wealth transfers associated

with the auction market and tax schemes, the regulatory agency
could devise Bome Bart of plan which directly allocates trans
ferable CFC permits among firms.

If thia plan gave firms exactly

the Dumber of permits they would purchase in an auction market
arrangement, firms would not have to bUy permits.

Thus these

transfers would be ellminated.
Devising euch a plan with imperfect foresight, however, i8
almost i.possible.

Blnce the regulatory agency cannot exactly

predict Which firms will cut back CFC use when eFC supplies are
limited, some firms will inevitably be allocated too maDy permits,
while others too few.

Allocation imperfections, however, can

be aael1y corrected by allowing firms to buy" and sell permits
from eaph other on a permit aftermarket.
redu~e

OFC use

be~auee

will,f~nd

A firm Which can easlly

many other firms Willing to buy permite

their respective control options are very costly.

Weal th transfers thus occur between fi rme, not be-tween firms
and the government.

Some firms are in fa.ct

Il

rewa rded" with revenue II

from permit sales if they can reduce their CFC use below their
allooation.

These reward possibilities stimulate development of

pollution control technologies.

Other firma, not able to reduce

CFO use must pay for extra permits in order to continue operating
at past production levels.

These permit purchases lower the pro

fitability of the firm and, if high enough, can cause plant closures.
The problem then 1s to devise a permit allocation scheme
which can minimize these purchases.
possible.

Many allooation schemes are

This report examines a simple rule which allocates a

ten year oumulative

orc

quota among industries on the basie of past

"b .
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CFC use.

Future increases 1n CFC uee predicted on the basia of

past increases and permits are allooated as a reduced percentage
of predicted use.

Firms are free to buy and lel1 permits at any

time o,ver the ten year period.

Further. they msy use them at

any time during the same ten year period,

Profit maximizing firms

will welgh the value of CFCs used to produce goods (uee value)
against the value of CFCB saved for future use or Bale (aeset
value).

By maximizing the sum of theBe two values firms will auto

matically allocate control responsibility over time.

25

This allocation scheme 1s essentially a "rule of thumb" which
the regulator uses to approximate future purchase of CFCe.

Any

"rule of thumb ll should not severly disadvantage any CFC user; it
should be objective as possible and immune to political swayings.

The specific implications of the stated allocative Bcheme i8
examined later in this report.
Like the auction market, the supply and demand for permits
will establish an equilibrium

prl~.

Profit maximizing firms w1l1

only purchaee permits if their MCPC 1s greater than the pri(e of

the permit.

Likewise. firms will only sell permits if the price

they reoeive for the permit 1s greater than their MCpe.

If these

ex'changes take place in a competi tl ve eet tlng, all firms will face
the same permit price and will buy and sell permits until their MCPC
equals the permit price.

Because marginal coet ara increasing,

ther.e is no way to reallocate pollution reductioos among firms to
reduce the total cost of pollution abatement.

Therefore, like the

auction scheme. pollution control costs are minimized.

25

26

Explanation i8 similar to that of footnote 23.

26

A mora formal proof that permit systems are cost· minimizing is
presented in: Montgomery (1912), pp. 395-418.
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Permit allocation schemes retain many of the desirable pro
perties of the permit auction scheme.

CFC use is reduced by a

known amount in a cost effective manner.

The interfirm distribution

of control responsibility automatically adjusts to changes in
demand and technology through the buying and selling of permits.
General price changes do not have to be incorporated into the
schemej they are automatically accounted for.

For an appropriately

de,slgned Bcheme, fIrm will automatically adjust use over time

80

ae to maximize the use value and asset value of CFCe.

Tbe permit allocation system goes further.
from

eFe

Transfers of wealth

users to government are largely eliminated with an

appropriately designed allocation rule.

Beca~Be

.of this, the

risk of plant closures and ensuing unemplo,ment are
e~lm1nated

~eatly

thus making auch a system easier to implement from a

political viewpoint.
There are, however, some drawbacks to the system.

First,

derining aD appropriate allooation rule reqUires information
gathering which may be very oostly.

For CFCs, this agaln would

require production information from 260,000 buainesses.
Seoondly, the regulatory agency must prevent monopolistic
and oligopolistlc concentrations of permits.

AS.previously

discussed, these concentrat1ons coUld undermine the cost effec
tiveness of the system.
The permit allocation scheme, nevertheless, represents a
major step towards lowering the costs ot regulation to firms while
retaining the market pressure to minimize abatement coats.
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The Unanswered Questions
After examining these strategies, the most obvious question
which arises 1s which of these methods would be most effective
in lessening CFC emissions?

As we have previously stated, the

best control strategy optimally combines, administrative ease.
political feasibility and cost effectiveness.
Administrative ease and political feasibility are virtues
of the types of strateg1es chosen; cost effectiveness relies on
the manner in which the strategies are implemented.

Determining

which control strategies can beat minimize these costs requires
an Indepth view of the CFC market.

This study examines two types

of ooetst compliance costs and transfer aoets.
Comgllance costs arethe resource costs incurred by firms In
.:..,

adapting to regulation.

These coste include investment purcha.ses

Of pollution equipment or lee8 polluting machinery and the coate
of employing substitutes 1n the production line.

Compliance coste

involve the consumption of resources, not merely the transfer of
resources.
only by

Because this ie true, compliance costs are borne not

eFe

related industries, but by society as a whole.

Society

forgoes consumption of other commodities 1n order to produce pollu
tion equipment.
Transfer costa do not involve the consumption of resources.
They are allocations of wealth from one sector of society to
another.

Though not a cost to the economy

a8

a Whole, transfers

are indeed real coets to affected industries.

For example, if a

eFe tax 1s levied, the tax payments by firma are transfer payments,
transferrins wealth from CFC industries to government.
Pagination anomaly: Page 29 skipped in numbering

Likewise,
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i~ regulation imposes a quota on CFC sales and the government
sells permits for CFC use. the payments for these permits again
represent transfers from CFe user to the government.

If the

permits are directly allocated to CFC users free of charge, any
salss among users in the permit aftermarket w111 result 1n trane
fers, in this case from the buyers of permits to the sellers.
Transfer costs, aany argue, unduly burden tae industry.

These

transfers raise the cost of doing business for firms that pay
them, leading to greater risks of plant olosures and worker
unemployment for those firms.

Therefore, as a matter of practice,

these costs should be kept to a minimum.
A goal of any regulatory strategy is thuB to minimize compliance
and transfer coets.

The following section describes our attempt

to evaluate these coats using a computer simUlation of the CFC
indue try.

IV.

THE SIMULATION MODEL

Description of the Model
The model used 1n this study 1s a computer simulation of
future CFC demand.

At its core are the projected demand schedules
27
for ere use a6 determined by a RAND Corporation study.
The
model torecastl the growth of CFC user industries from 1980 to
1990.

It alBa predicts how much each industry will cut back CFC

purchases in response to higher CFC pricee.
OWing to the extensive efforts of the RAND Corporation in
preparing its stUdy. this study 1s able to include most of the
major industries which use CFCs.

For the Bake of simplicity,
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This study will group the many industrial uses of CFCs 1nto seven
categoriss: flexible foam, solvent, urethane foam, nonurethane
foam, mobile air conditioning, refrigeration and other.
lists the industries included in each category.
account for about three-quarters of total

eFe

Table IV

These categorise

production.

Much

of the other quarter of production 1s composed of home and euper
market air conditioning, product areaB not considered by the RAND
study.
TA~

IV; INDUSTRIAL USES OF CFCs FOR EACH CATEGORY CONSIDERED
IN TEXT

Category

Industry Uses

Flex.! ble Foam

Flexible urethane toams

Solvents

Solvents

Urethane Foam

Rigid urethane foams and
lsocyanurates

Nonurethane Foams

Rigid polystyrene and extruded
polyolefln foams

Mobile Air Conditioning

All automobile, light truck and
van air conditioners.

Refrigeration

Chillers, home refrigerators and
freezers, and retail food refrig
eration.

other

Liquld fast freezing, 8terilants,
dehumidifiers, and others
For each industry, the model allowB us to predict CFC pur

chases; it does not deal directly with

eFe

emissions.

Th1s 1s a

plaus1ble simplification because reductions in CFC purchases closely
approximate reductions in emiesions.

27

RAND (1980).

In fact, the RAND Oorporation

•
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estimates that 95 percent of all reductions under a system of

28
economic incentives come from

II

prompt " emitters.

There 1s aleo

a practical consideration for targeting purchases rather than

emissions; while there are millions of point sources of emissions.
there are only a handful of plants which produce CFCs. making
CFC purchases easy to moniter.
Since this study makes no attempt to define an optimal reduc
tion goal, several benchmark reductions are examined.
reductions are presented 1n unite of permit pounds.

These
By converting

to permit pounds, differences in the ozone depleting potential
of various CFC compounds are automatically accounted for.

Table V

lists these conversion factors.
TABLE V.

CONVERSION FACTORS OF VARIOUS CFC COMPOUNDS TO PERMIT
POUNDS

Type of CFC

Conversion Factor

(permit pounds per pound CFC)

1.36

eFC - 11

CFC - 12
CFC-113
CFC-22
CFC-502
SourC91

1.03
1.00

0.103
.26
RAND 1980, p. 216.

The cumulative ten year reduction goals examined in this
study are 800, 1000, 1200. and 1500 million permit pounds of CFCs.
Unregulated CFC use between 1980 and 1990 is projected at over

6.6 billion permit pounds by our model.

Though our benchmark

flguree are small compared to actual CFC use. they represent the
hlgheet cumulative reductions we could exam1ne with available data.

28

RAND (1980), p. 214.

-33

The model 1s specifically designed to look at the effects
of economic incentives as a control strategy.

Three schemes

are examined: a tax scheme, a permit auction Bcheme and & permit
allooation scheme.
The tax scheme reduces CFC emissions by taxing CFC purchases.
This study examines the effects of a

~lat

rate real tax on all

purchases of virgin CFCs from the years 1980 through 1990.
tax rates are examined.

Four

In 1980 dollars, they are:

0.70 dollars per
1.03 dollars per
1.22 dollars per
2.01 dollars per

permit
permit
permit
permit

pound
pound
pound
pound

of erc
of CFC
of CFC
of CFC

These particular tax rates were chosen in order to achieve the
benohmark reduction goals.

It shoUld be noted that these are

real tax rates, implying that the taxes are automatically adjusted
for inflation.

In the real world, this could be accomplished by

tytng the tax rate to a price index or by stating tax rates &s
a percentage of the price of CFCe.

For the sake of simplicity,

this study assumes no inflation over the ten year period.
When looked at from an lntertemporal perspective, a flat
rate tax 18 not necessarily an optimal tax.

If optimality implies

that the present value of pollution abatement costs are minimized,
then an optimal tax must be tied

~

the discount rate (r).

In

tact, the cost min1mizing pattern of pollution abatement can be
calculated by mlnimiz1us the following equation with respect to
the vector of reductions Qt:
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10

min
where

~

[

C~(~)

Q

= coat of reducing emissions by quantity

~

=

the cumulative reduction mandated by EPA

=

the Lagrangian multiplier

at time t.

When this equation is minimized, a very interesting relation
ship arises:

Using the information that the marginal cost of pollution control
will equal the tax rate, this implies that the optimal tax rate
will increase by a factor ot (l+r) eaoh year.

29

This study does not simulate the effects of a changing optimal
tax rate on CFC purchases.

Rather, we chose to simulate the

simpler flat rate tax scheme which is probably more likely to
prevail.
cesaes.

Tax rates are determined by legal and political pro
Because of this, tax rates are otten difficult to change.

Even if the legislative body Is-·amenable to changes, there 18
no guarantee that the tax rates would change by a
each year.

fa~tor

of (l+r)

Also. as we Later conclude, a nonoptimal flat tax

cl08e1y approximates the optimal solution.

29

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor
Tietenberg 1n deriving this relationship.

-
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The permit auction simulation looka at the effects of an
auction of a ten year cumulative quota of allowable CFC purchases.
Firms are free to choose when and how to use their permits over
the ten year period.

Because of this freedom, the model assumes

that firms will choose the optimal Intertemporal allocation of
control responsibility.

In other worde, firms will minimize

the present value of pollution abatement coate over ten years.
This implies that the equilibrium price of permits on the permit
aftermarket rises by a factor of (ITT) each year over the ten
year period.
The permit allocation scheme differs from the auction scheme
only with respect to the manner in Which the permits enter the
market.
bidders.

In the auction market, they are given to the highest

In the permit allocation scheme, they are allocated

free of charge among emitters on the basis of some non-price
allocation rule.

The simple alloca.tive

t1

ru l e of thumb" examined

in this paper usee past CFC use ae a basis for future allocation.
Specifically, the permit allocation rule tollows the equation:
1990

Ci ::.

Z

t=1980
where

(u~,t
1s the total number of permits
allocated to industry i for the
ten year period 1980 to 1990
(1 permit 1 permit pound)
is the expected unregUlated CFC
use for the years 1980 to 1990
for industry i
1s the reduction factor (which
applies to all industries for
any particular year) necessary
to achieve the reduction goal.
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The total allocation of permits is subject to the constraint:

where n 1s the total number of CFC user industries

Q* 1s the aggregate reduction goal (in permit pounds)
Thus each industry is .allocated permits as a reduced percentage
of expected future purchaaes.

These future purchases are est!

mated from past : . growth of eacb industry_

The

a~tual

data

which we used 1s presented later in this report.
As in the auction scheme, firms are free to choose when and
how to use their permits o'v,er the ten years _
assumes that each

indust~y

Again, the model

will choose an optimal intertemporal

allocation of control responsibility, implylog that the equili

brium price of permits on the permit exchange market will rise
by a ractor of

(l~r)

each year over the tan year period.

For all these schemes. the model predicts how much CFC
p,z-lc,ee will be raised and how much total CFC use will be cut

back.

Further, it forecasts how each industry will respond to

CFC control by computing the induBtryls pollution abatement expen
30
dituree and its expenditures on CFC permits or taxes. The
present value of costs are computer over the ten year period 1980
through 1990 and are presented in 1980 dollars.

30

This study does not de6crib~ any specific methode of reducing CFC
use. For an explanation .of control technologies availa.ble to each
industry, see RAND (1980). pp. 34-211.
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Relationship to the Unanswered Questions
Optimal regulation minimizes the costs of control to both

eFe

users and society as a whole.

Through the simulation model,

we attempt to determine these costs for each regulatory Bcheme.
the model computes the two types of costs discussed in Section

III~

1.e. compliance costs and transfer costs.
Compliance coste for each level of emissions reduction are
calculated from analysis of the aggregate demand schedules for
CFes.

These demand schedules, each covering one of the years

1980 to 1990, predict the quantity of CFe use that would result
from various price increments tha.t might be se"t by policy.

Each

effectively takes the form of a step function where at certain
price increments or "critical prices tl control options become
cost effective for various groupe of users.
can be interpreted as what RAND calls the
emissions"
(MCPC).

31

tl

These price increments
marglnal coet of avoiding

or what we term the marginal cost of pollution control

If we graphically plot each price increment versus the

reSUlting reductions, we obtain a MCPC schedule which 1s also a
step function (Figure 3).
MCPC
permit price
tax rate

Q*

reduction units of eFC purchases

Figure 3: The Marginal Cost of Pollution Control
Schedule

31

RAND 1980, p. 219.
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Our model computes compliance costa for each price and quantity
combination (P*, Q*) by summing the area of the rectangles under

J:

the MCPC curve between zero and Q*:

compliance cost.a :.

MCPC

dQ

Compliance costs are totaled over ten years and presented in
discounted 1980 dollars.
Transfer costs are alao evaluated using the aggregate CFC
demand schedules.
1.

Theee coste are influenced by three factors:

each industry's purchases of CFCs under regulation, 2. the

price of CFCs over and above the "normal" market price, and
3. (for permit schemes only) the number of permits allocated
to the industry.
The model computes the size of annual transfers for each
industry by mUltiplying the amount of contlnulng CFC use under
the policy by the tax or permit price for each pollcy deelgn
minus any permits given to them by the government:
transfer cost
Where

p*

(c* - C)

p*

ie the price of CFC use (either the tax
or permi t price)

C*

is total CFC use

C

18 the allocation of permits free of
charge by the government~

Note that transfers can either be positive or negative depending
on whether the firm is a nat buyer or

sall~r

of permits.

For

the tax and permit auction Bchames. transfers are always positive
becausEI

C=. O.

-39To compute aggregate transfer coste, we sum up only the
positive transfer costs.

Negative transfers are in effect

revenues for affected industries.

Since revenues are the oppo

site of coeta, it would be a misnomer to include them in a costs

32
category.

Transfer costs are totaled over ten years and pre

santed in discounted 1980 dollars.
The Data
The RAND Corporation's projected demand schedules for CFCa
for the years 1980 and 1990 provide the backbone of this study.
(Table VI).

These two schedules identify certain "critical

prlces ll at Which technical options become cost effective for
various industries.

Thes6 estimated aggregate demand schedules

incorporate all the industrial uses listed in Table IV;
The 1980 RAND report presents only the 1980 and 1990 aggre
gate demand sChedules.

We therefore had to extrapolate demand

schedules for intermediate years.

For all product areas except

solvents, the RAND "critical prices u remain effective in both
1980 and 1990.

In other words, a particular price increment which

reduces CFC use in 1980, also reduces CFC use 1n 1990.

The only

difference 1s that the quantity of induced reductions changes in

1990 from 1980, reflecting the overall increase of CFC use 1n
1990. for each of these

tl

cr itlcal pricas ll , we extrapolated lnter

32
For the permit scheme (the only scheme where negative transfers
are possible), transfers occur between each industry. To obtain
B.. measure of the total volume of transfers from one industry to
another, the aggregate transfer coat figures need only be doubled.
If all transfers under this scheme were added (signs included}, the
sum would be zero.
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mediate year reductions with the formula:
kt

~980e..

where

Q,t

is the quantity of reductions at time t.

k

is a constant growth rate

t

1s the years since 1980.

For the solvents industry. RAND projects that the supply price
for CFC solvents (CFC-113) will decline as production increases
33
because of economies of scale.
Thus the "critical pricee"
at which solvent use is reduced changes fram 1980 to 1990 as
yearly production increases.

In deriVing the intermediate

demand reductions for this study. we assume that the critical
pricee do not change for the solvents industry from 1980 to 1990.
Rather, we assume that the quantity of reductions at each of
these critical pricBs changes in the following manner.
tt

For each

critlcal prlce tl which affects solvent use in 1980 and not in

1990, we assume that 1980 experiences the full decrease in demand
from the price increment and that this decrease gets steadily
smaller each year until 1990, where there 1s no demand decrease
from the price increment.

Thus the critical price reductions

are gradually phased out over ten years.

For each

II

critica1

price ll which affects solvent use in 1990 and not in 1980. we
assume that 1980 experiences no decrease in demand from the price
increment, but intermediate years experience progressively larger
decreases until 1990, where the RAND data shows the decrease in
demand.

Thus the critical price reductions are gradually phased

in over ten years at a constant rate.

These assumptions relieved

ue from speculating Ilcritical price ll changes over the tlmeepan.

33

RAND 1980. p. 219.
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Table VI-a
Demand Schedule for CFCa, Aggregate 1980
Price Increment
(1980 • per
permi t pound b)
0.00
0.10

0.25
0.28
0.31
0.32
0.35
0.49
0.72
0.79
0.80
0.82
1.20
1.22

1.39
1.67
1.79
1.80
1.86
2.17

2.85

Product Area. of
Induced Activity
Flex.1 ble Foam
Retail Food
Flexible Foam
Solvents
Retail tood, PS sbeet
Flexible Foam
Solvents
Flexible Foam
PS sheet
Solvents
Flexible Foam
FleXible Foam
Flexible Foam
pa sheet
PS sheet

Solvents
P8 sheet
PS sheet
Mobile Air Conditioning
Solvents

Total CFC
Usea
(millions of
permit pO'unds)
454.9
431.7
427.6
424.8
424.3
421.9
414.7
401.2
396.2
392.4
387.8
386.4
1575.5
368.2
366.4
364.4

356.3
352.6

350.7
348.1
343.5

Sourcel RAND 1980, p. 266 (all pricee changed to 1980 dollars.

a

Indicates price increment above supply price. The supply price
for CFC-l13 declines as production increases as a result of
economics of scale.
b

One permit pa~nd 1s equivalent to 1.00 pound of CFC-113, Oa97 pound
of CFC-12, 0.73 pound of CFC-li. or 3.87 pounds of CFC-502.
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Table VI-b
Demand Schedule for CFCe, Aggregate 1990
Price Increment
(1980 • per
permit pound b
0.00
0.10
0.21
0.25
0.28
0.32
0.35
0.49
0.10
0.71
0.79
0.82
1.03
1.20
1.22
1.39
1.67
1.80
1.86
2.01
2.17
3.09

Product Area of
Induced Activity
Flexible Foam
Solvents
Retail Food
Flexible Foam
Retail Food, PS sheet
Flexible Foam
Solvents
Solvents
Flexible Foam
PS sheet
Flexible foam
Solvents
Flexible Foam
Flexible Foam
P5 sheet
PS sheet
PS sheet
I'S sheet
Solvents
Mobile Air Conditioning
Solvents

Total a CFC
Use
(millions of
permit pounds
784.4
741.4
132.3
725.4
721.3
717.9
707.0
706.2
683.6
675.8
669.9
667.9
660.1
643.3
632.4
629.5
626.4
620.5
617.6
603.2
598.3
590.5

Source: RAND 1980, p. 266 (all prices changed to 1980 dollars.
a

Indicates price increment above supply price. The supply price
tor CFC-113 declines as production increases a6 a result of
aConomia's of scala.
b

One permit pound is equivalent to 1.00 pound of CFC-113, 0.97 pound
of CFC-12, 0.73 pound of eFC-ll, or 3.87 pounds of CFC-502.

-43It should further be noted for the sake of comparison that
all prices and costs in the RAND study are in 1976 dollars.
This study converts all prices and costa to 1980 dollars by
multiplying by a factor of (263.2/187.2) which i8 ratio of the
chemi.cal commodities price indices for 1980 and 1976 respectively.
The permit allocation scheme examined in this report allo
cates permits as a reduced percentage of projected use.

The

projected 1980 and 1990 use figures for each product area are
presented 1n Table VII.

Use figures for intermediate years grow

at a constant rate each year.
Table VII

projected Use of CFCs (1n millione of permit pounds)
Assuming No Regulation

1980

l2.2Q

66.1

89.9

Solvents

78.3

146.7

Rigid Urethane Foam

97.3

213.8

Nonurethane foam

37.6

71.7

100.9

128.8

Refrigeration

37.3

48.8

other

27.3

84.1

Product Area

Mobl~e

Air Conditioning

Source: Compiled from projected use figures given 1n RAND 1980,
sections IlIA through lIIH.
All cumulative coats presented 1n this study are presented
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-44as present values.

The use of present values is the econom.lst I B

way of comparing costs and benefits
points 1n time.

~hlch

occur at different

Future costs (or benefits) are discounted to

allow for the fact that they are le8s costly (valuable) than
present ones.

Income which iS'not used for purchases of pollution

control equipment can be used to invest. say in the stock market.
and earn a return.

Present value 1s computed by the formula

n
PV

i=O

where R1 1s the future cost (benefit)
r is the interest rate.
The choice of the interest rate is very important 1n deter
mioing present values.
vast.

The 11.terature devoted to this topic 1s

One SChool of thought argues that the rate used should be

the same as the pre-tax rate of return to investment in the
35
private sector;
a second school of thOUght argues that the
rate should be lower. because government investment has l1ttle
or no risk. and because the risk premium 1n prlvat·e investment
3:6
represents a true soclal cost.

Martin Bailey argues that there is no c.ase for using a low
discount rate for discounting the benefits or costs of CFC control.
Using a low rate would place too heavy a burden on present genera
t1ons.

He argues that medical and/or technological breakthroughs

35

Martin J. Bailey. tiThe Discount Rate for Environmental Control
Programs" unpub11shed paper presented at the EPA Conference on
Qzone Depletion, Port Deposit, Maryland, July 1978.

36

A. Praet and R. Turvey, "Coat-Benefit Analysia: A survey."
Econom1c Journal 75 (1965).
37
Bailey

37
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may, for example, make the treatment of skin cancer relatively
simple.

He recommends using the private sector rate of return

of 11 percent.

This study also uses this discount rate for

most calculations.

In some cases, a sensitivity analysis is

conducted to show how sensitive the conclusions are to the
choice of discount rate.
V.

THE RESULTS

In this section, we present the data generated by our
simulation model.

For each regulation,Bcheme, we describe the

magnitude of both the compliance coata and the transfer coate.
We aleo examine the distribution of these costs among industries.
The results of each Bcheme are then compared and contrasted.

We

then analyze how these costs change if regulation 1s delayed.
CFC Taxes
The levying of a nonoptimal flat rate CFC tax has great
potential to reduce CFC use.

However, Buch a regulatory Bcheme

generates enormOUB transfer costs for each industry.

Table VIIl

shows the aggregate reductions and coste as-Bociated wi th various
tax rates a8 predicted by the model.
Table VIII: The Effects of Various Flat Rate CFC Taxes on Aggre
gate CFC use (1980 - 1990)

fax Rata
per permit
1b CFC <11
0.10
1.03
1.22
2.01

CUDIula t1 va
CFC Reductlon
x10 6 lbs.
826
1033
1283
1535

Compliance
COS~B"

xlO

131
237
418
686

•

Transfer
Cosl5*
~
2424
3439
3892
6111

.. all costa discounted at 11 percent, and presented in 1980 dollars.
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We Bee immediately that these tax rates will induce the
CFC industry to spend several hundred million dollars on pollu
tlon control eqUipment.

As control 1s increased, these compliance

costs rise more than proportionately to the tax while cumulative
reductions rise less than proportionately.

TheBe costs are

broken down by industry in Tabla IX.
Table IX

Cumulative Compliance Costs* by Industry under Various
Flat Rate Taxes

Tax Rate per Permit Pound
Industry

0.70

eFe

1.22

2.01

Flexible Foam

46

86

266

266

Solvent

76

112

112

247

Urethane Foam

o

o

o

o

NODuratbane Foam

5

30

30

163

Moblle Air

o

o

o

o

10

10

10

o

o

o

Re'frlgera to r

10

o

Other

'.dlscounted at all percent a.nd presented in millions of 1980 dollars
We see that the flexible foam and solvent industry are moat apt
to invest 1n CFC conserving technologies.

The urethane foam and

mobile ,air cond1 tion1ng industries are not persuaded to invest
in such technologies.
Aggregate transfer costs follow a different trend than com
pliance costs.

As control is increased, these costs increase at

a slower rate than the compliance coste (Table VIII).

For any

partlcular level of control, transfers are of significantly greater
magnitude than compliance coste, amounting to totals of several
b11l10n dollars.

This 1e indeed a major transfer of wealth from

industry to government.
lndustry.

Table IX breaks down these costs by
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Tabla X: Total Cumulative Transfer Costs- by Industry under Various
Flat Rate Taxes
Tax Rate per Permit Pound CFC
Industry

0.10

1.03

1.22

2.01

Flexible Foam

1619

194

41

11

Solvent

386

521

625

886

Urethane Foam

7°1

1031

1221

2011

.Non Urethane Foam

235

313

371

454

Mobile Air

537

790

936

1542

Refrigeration

173

254

301

496

other

225

331

392

646

-discounted at 11 percent and presented in millions of 1980 dollars.
';, For most industries, "Ie see a gradual rise 1n the amount of
transfer payments as regulation becomes more strict, reflecting
both the higher taxes users must pay 1n order to continue using
eFCa and the inability to reduoe CFC use even in the face of
higher prices.

However, for the flexible foam industry we find

that transfers go both up and down as regulation 18 increased.
This reflects the fact that CFCs used 1n flexible foam production
have high demand elasticities.

As the price of CFCs increases,

flexible foam producers would rather switch to alternative blOWing
agents than use more expensive CFCe.

Thus there 1s substantial

investment in alternative technologies which show up
costs, not transfer costs.

a8

compliance

Oppositely, CFCs used in mobile air

conditioning and urethane foam, have very low demand elasticities,
implying that these industries do not find alternatives to CFee
cost affective under the tax rates considered here.

Theae indus

tries do not invest in emissions control. rather they pay the higher
price for CFCs, thuB their costs under regulation show up ae
transfer coste.
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Permit Auction Market
The aggregate results of employing a permit auction Bcheme

are presented in Table XI.
Aggregate Compliance and Transfer Costs* for Government
Auction of permlts (1980-1990)
Compliance
Transfer
1980 Permlt
1990 Permit
Price*
Price*
Cogts
Cogts
Redgctlon Goal
(per lb CFC)
(per Ib CFC)
(10 permit Ibs)
10 •
10 L
Table XI:

*

794

0.35

0.82

116

1807

995

0.49

1.39

203

2530

1203

0.72

2.01

330

3686

1514

1.39

2.85

635

6421

discounted at 11 percent and presented in 1980 dollars

** permit prices are assumed to increase by a factor of (l.r) or
1.11 each year to allow optimal intertemporal allocation,
Permit prices do not exactly follow this progression because
of the step function nature of our data.

These figures are very similar to those of the tax scheme.

Com

pliance costs for 1980 to 1990 are measured in magnitudes of
100 million dollars and transfer costs in billions of dollars.
Even the average permit pricee over tbe ten years are roughly
the same aB the tax rates of the tax Bcheme.
As control 1e increased, compliance coste rise more than
proportionately to the reductions goal.

Transfer coste rise at

a slower rate, but are of much greater magnitude,

When compliance

costs are broken down by industry (Table XII), we find that the
flexible foam and solvents industry invest moat heavily 1n CFC
conserving techniques.

Urethane foam doss not inveet at all.

Unlike the tax Bcheme, the mobile air conditioning industry reduces
CFC UBe at higher levels of control.
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Table XII:

Cumulative Compliance COBtS* by Industry under a
Permit System
Reduction Goal (x10 6 permit pounds)
794
995
1203
1514

Industry
FleXible Foam

56

92

160

266

Solvent

~

83

113

206

0

0

0

0

10

18

0

0

10

10

0

0

Urethane Foam
Nonurethane Foam
Mobile Air
Refrigeration
Other

46

127

0

25

10

10

0

0

*discounted at 11 percent and presented in millions of 1980 dollars.
Total compliance costs are dwarfed by aggregate transfer
coats, the latter being abcut ten times larger than the former.
These transfers take the form of permit payments from
to the government.

They are broken up by

l~duetry

eFe

ueers

in Table XIII.

For all induetries, except flexible foam, these costs are quite
substantial.

For the mobile air conditioning and urethane foam

industries, these costs rise rapidly ae the degree of control
1s increased.

For nonurethane foam and flexible foam, transfere

rise lees rapidly under stricter control.

This again reflects

the respective demand elasticity of CFCs in each production;
urethane foam and mobile air conditioning being very inelastio,
nonurethane foam and flexible foam being much more elastic.
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Table XIII:

Transfer Costs* of Permit Auction Scheme

Industry

Reduction Goals in Permit Pounds
1514
1203
794
995

Flexible Foam

109

120

III

69

Solvent

310

404

579

957

Urethane Foam

528

769

1159

2134

Nonurethane Foam

170

239

330

510

Mobile Air

386

560

847

1544

Refrigeration

124

180

273

506

Other

178

257

396

703

* discounted at 11 percent and presented in millions of 1980 dollars.
Permit Allo_cat,ion Bcheme

CFC

Allocating, perm1te to industry has the potential of lowering
the coat of regulation to firms by lowering the volume of transfer
costs.

.Under this scheme, transfers do not occur between CFC

users and government, but between each industry from the buying
and selling of permits.

Table XIV shows that while the compliance

cost from such a Bcheme are the eame as under the permit auction
scheme, transfers are much lower for each reduction goal.
Table XIV:
Red~ct1on

(10'

Goal
permit 1be)

794
995
1203
1514
•

**
*.*

Aggregate Compliance and Transfer Costs- for Permit
Allocation Scheme (1980-1990)
Permit Price*'*
(per lb. CFC)
1980
1990

0.35

.49
.72

1.39

0.82
1.39
2.01
2.85

C!ompll~ce

.

10.

Coste

Transfer
Couts
lOb

116
203
330
635

L.

165
283
510

1144

discounted at 11 percent and presented in 1980 dollars.
permit pr1ces are assumed to increase by a factor of
1.11 each year to allow optimal intertemporal allocation.
Permit prices do not exactly follow this progression because
of the step function nature of our data.
Transfer costs include only positive transfers
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Tabla XV:

.

Total Cumulative Transfer Costs* under the Permit
Allocation Schema (1980-1990)

"".

Reduction Goal
995
1203

Industry

194

Flexible Foam

-103

-203

-3615

-158

Solvent

-15.1

-51.3

-84.9

-198

64.9

116.8

210.4

484.7

8.9

13.1

1.1

-64.1

Mobl1e Alr

46.3

82.8

151.4

323.9

Refrigerati,on

-3.0

1.6

12.4

51.1

1.6

~40

10.6

160.1

Urethane Foam
Nonurethane Foam

Other

*

1514

discounted at II percent and presented in 1980 dollars.
We see that overall transfer payments to each 1ndustry

substantially reduced.

In fact.

Borne

fi rIDS actually reel'll va

transfers or, in effect. rewards tor reduction of CFC use.
are firms which oan readily adapt to higher CFC pr1ces.

These

The

fleXible foam industry, for example, has many open opt1ons to
reduce CFO use such as Bubstitution of methylene chloride or.
in some cases, evan water as the bloWing agent 1n the production
process.

Therefore, even though past growth would indicate that

this 1ndustry should receive a large number of per-mi.ts,. it has
many a1 te,rt1,atives to CFC use and can become a. net seller of permi ts.
By contrast, the urethane foam industry (p~oducer of insulating

materials) has fewer options.

CFCs are a necessary part of the

final product because of their inherent insulating qualities.

In

fact, this type of CFC foam provides the highest possible level
of thermal efficiency available on todayls market.

Industrial

sources claim that no other blowing agent can provide these lnsu
latlng qualities.

Because of this inelastic demand for CFCa, this

industry will offer high bids for available permits.
a nat buyer of permits.

It 1s thus
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Unlike the transfer coste, the compliance costs are the
sama for both the permit allocation and permit auction schemes.
This is true becauee

bo~h

strategies allow firms to optimize the

intertemporal distribution of control responsibility.

This implies

that firms are allowed to shift control expenditures over the
period 1980 to 1990 in order to minimize the present value of
expenditures.
discount rate.

Thus the level of control is closely tied to the
F1gure 4 shows that these compliance coats vary

under different discount rates.
coats are

ln~erBely

We Bee that total compliance

related to the discount rate.

As the interest

rate increases, aggregate compliance costs decreases, as the
lnter-e,st rat,s dee11nse, aggregate compliance coste increase.
Comparison ,of Hegulatory Strategies
The compliance costs associated with each of these strategies
are,

~ery

close to one another for each benchmark reduct! on (FIgu.re 5).

This 18 true even though the two quota system strategies use an
intertemporal cost minimiZing strategy (deacribed earlier) which
gradually applies the burden of regulation on each industry.

While

the tax scheme uses a constant real tax rate which is not necessa
rily optimal, it turns out that the degree of cost increase asso
ciated with this simple tax rate ie very small.

At high levels

of control, this difference becomes slightly more pronounced,
but 1s still negligible when compared to total compliance coste
(Figure

5).

The major difference between strategies lies in the amount
of transfer payments which CFC users must shell out.

Figura 6

shows these transfers as a function of aggregate reductions.
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Figure 1.H Compliance Costs * at Various
Discount Rates

•

)
;

./'-
-

.. r=.05·

)

-._-.- 'j'
-

-

- )

.- -

- -

-

_..

-_.

. ~.'. =~ ~.' '. -. /
--~- ~~

)

.

..

..

/

.

.

/'
·:r~·Ll1..

/

,/

--,
,/

, .

) .

•

/

/

-",'

.

/

".

/

..•/~/""

-

-- "

..
800

1000

.../ .

/'

-

-

•

* assumes optimal
intertemporal
allocation of control
responsibility

1200
1 00
6
reductions (xl0 permit Ibs)

Aggregate CFC purchases

,. /
/

..

/"

Figure

5. Cumulative Compliance Costs *

for Various Reduction Goals (1980-1990)

.-..
$

o 300
co

'".....

CFC Tax Scheme

ft.;

0

Cfl

~

0
•..-1

250

r-i
rl

'g

Permit Auction Scheme
and
Permit Allocation Scheme

.......,.
+'
Cfl
0

.'

200

()

Q)
()

,I

/

C

Cl1

.r-!

rl

~150
0

1

I

v

f

c..>

//
100

./

"

~/

'

/

~

* discounted at

11 percent

50

I

--l

~oo

,

~

600

I
I

-t

800

-+

I

I

I

!

1000
1200
6
reductions (xl0 permit pounds)
aggregate CFC purchases

1

1400

I

-55-

we

eae that the transfers under the permit allocation scheme

are much les8 than those under the other strategies for all
reductions considered.

Transfers are, in fact, only about

one ten'th as large as a1 ther the emis'sions tax or permit ,auction
schemes.

Under these later schemes, transfers are roughly equi

v,alent.

At lower levels of control, the permi t auction is actually

les6 costly, but this difference decreases as control ie increased.
The Costs of Waiting
An important policy consideration of CFC regulation is

deciding when to implement control.

This problem 18 contingent

upon how fast control coets rise as regulation 16 delayed.

Our

modal shows tha.t the compliance costs necessary to achieve a
part1cular aggregate reduction goal rise substantially when policy
is delayed.

Further, a8 the

amoun~

the "'cost of wai ting lt rises faster.
for two benchmark reductions.
~egulation

of regulation 1s increased,
Figure 7 shows 'this relation

Both curves rise exponetlally as

is delayed, suggesting the need for prompt regulatory

action should oontrol be deemed desirable.
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Figure 6.

en Year C~mulative
Transfer Costs at various
Reductions Goals
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-585UMXARY AND CONCLUSION

The regulatory problem of controlling CFC use fairly and
efficiently 1&

re~arkably

using CFCe in dozens of
trol.

~·P.A.

vast and complex.

app~~.atlone

Thousands of

f~

are all candidates for con

mu's t wo'rk 1 ts way thro ugh a maze

0

f regulatory 0 ptl ons

which includes mandatory controls, CFC bane. CFC deposit schemes
and 8cono.10 Incl;tntlves.

This ,study attempts to shed some light

o'n regulation tnrough aconomi'c incantivee.
The incentlve,s approach reduces CFC use by raising CFC priCEtB.
This ra1ss,s the opportunity cost of using CFCB J making les.s pollU
ting

alternatlv~8

to CFC use more attractive.

The incentives

approacn is fleXible, eas11y adjusting to changes in CFO demand.
Unlike othe'r cont,rol options, th1s approach insures a cost .,ffective
allocation of control responsibility among firms.

Further, 1t

fostera continuous market pressure to develop new control tech
nalogl@s and maintain old ones.

This study

exami~es

three

~ays

to implement such a system of economic lncentiTes; levying

&

constant real tax on CFC purchases, auctioning CFC permits and
allocatIng CFC permits.
Major iaelr1cal F1nd1ng8
Our model reveala a Dumber of important relationships coo
'cerning CFC regulation.
t~de

We do not claim that the actual magni

of these findings 18 accurate

regul.atlon.

eno~gh

to be the basis for CFC

It 1s useful, however, as a benchmark: to see the

impacts of alternative regulatory strategies.

We find that the coat of compliance for each Bcheme is very
sensitive to the degree of control.

Roughly. for every doubl1ng

of the reduction goal. compliance costs rise five times.
agrees with our intuitive estimate that as control

This

beco~e.

greater,
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emissions increasingly become more difficult to control.

EPA

should therefore proceed cautiously with regulation until more
deflnative eVidence on ozone depletion 1s established.
We find that the transrer coste, also, are very sensitive to
the degree of control. ror 1nstance, as the aggregate reduction
goal 1s doubled trom

75~

to 1500 million permit pounds, transfers

under the permit allocation Bcheme rise by about one b111ion dis
counted 1980 dollars over ten years.

Under the tax and permit

auction schemes, this rise 1s even more dramatic, accounting
for an increase of almost five billion discounted dollars over
ten years.
Two effects working against each other determine the level
of transfers: the transactions effect and the marginal cost
effect.

The transactions effect deals with the level of eFC

purchases.
CrCa.

As CFC control ls increased,

fir~8

will

b~y

less

The number of eFC transactions will therefore be les8 and

the volume of permit payments or tax payments will also be less.
However, as the level of control increases, each permit will be
worth more.

Because control options become increasingly more

expensive, firms will be Willing to pay more (in the form of CFC
taxe. or permit payments) in order to avoid paying for control
optionee

This 1s the marginal cost effect.

We find that the marginal cost effect greatly outweigh. the
transaction effect for all the Bchemes considered.
ooete rise rapidly as control 1s incremented.

Transfer

This again indicates

that EPA should proceed cautiously with regulat10n until the results
of further scientific study are In.
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For any specific reduction goal, all three regulatory sohemes
result in s,lmilar compliance costs.

Even the non-optimal constant

real tax strategy ,yields an outcome which comes quite close to
least cost Bolutio,n.

&

The' two perm1 t designs (which are, by virtue

or their design, Intertemporally optimal) result in slightly
lower compliance costs beoause they allow firms to allocate control
responsibility over time.

Alternative tax schemes (not studied

1n this report) could achieve this lower cost. bwt would necess1
tate continuous changes in the tax rate.
barrl.ers would make thi B dlfflcul t.

Political and legal

Nevertheless. a simple tax

rate design comes remarkably close to the least oost Bolutlon
and would be a useful regulatory strategy

partlcB~arly

When EPA

is not trying to hit a specific reduction target.
Unlike compliance costs, we find that transfer costs vary
tremendously under different schemes.
auotion

sche~es,

Under the tax and permit

transfers are substantial. amounting to several

b1llion 1980 dollars over ten years.

crcs are only a minor cost

in tne production of various products.

Effective CFC price

increases, must therefore amount. to, s·evaral :fold increas,ea over
the bas,10 price, of CFCs 1n orde'r to persuade firms to try
atl tuttls.
~hr8aten

su~

Such prt,ce' i'bcr-eues leaS. 1.& hl8b trallsf"sn. costs wbich
piant

8~Q8ane~.aad

aee'oral.

ene~oloyment

the pol.1tical process of ElstabI1,'shing regulation,.

and could impede
EPA should

therefore find regulatory strategies which reduce these transfers.

The permit allocation scheme examined in this paper reduces
transfer ooats tremendously (approximately ten fold f'or each level
of reduction).
to CFC users.

In effect CFC emissions are reduced at lass cost
Thus, utiliZing a simple

II

ru l e of thumb" permit
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distribution has the potential to reduce transfer costs sub
stantially w1thout jeopardizing the incentive to control.
This study goes further to examine the effects of delaying
regulatIon.

~e

find that in order to achieve the benchmark

aggregate reduction goals in less time, substantially mora
resources must go into pollution control.

Two effects (the:

marginal cost effeGt and tbe present value effect) working con
trary to one another determine this outcome.
The marginal cost effect, as previously stated, refers to
the increases 1n pollution control costs as regulation becomes
more stringent.

By delay1ng regulation, the burden of controlling

eFC emissions is shifted to the future.

If regulation is then

deemed necessary, the faot that no reductions were instituted
earlier will mean that more stringent controls are necessary to
meet any aggregat ,ereduct1on goal.
more expensive.

Oontrol options will thus be

The present value effect, on the other hand, works

in the opposite direction.

It deals with the mechanism of dis

counting (discussed. in section IV).

Expenditures in later yeare

add l'88s to present value than expend1 tures now.

Therefore.

d1verting pollution control investments to the future lowers the
pres,ant value o,r each cdntrol expend! ture.
Our model clearly lndicates that the marginal cost effect
dominates when regUlation 1s delayed.

The cost of pollution

control. holding total control constant. increases rapidly a8
regulation 1s deferred further into the future.

For example. a

two year delay will increase compliance costs by roughly 15 percent
whereas a five year delay will increase coate by about 75 percent.
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Policy ImRlicatlons
These findings sU6gest the need for immediate regulatory
aation or

so~e

sort.

Though many scientists are uncertain about

the extent of ozone depletion, most conclude that if ozone deple
tio.n does. o'ccur, the consequences will be serlo\l& •.. Given this
potential for.great

har~and-given·the'high

would seem .advisable to institute some
cularly an administratively

simpl~

cost of waiting, it

for~of

regulation, parti

9FC tax.

The funds from such a tax can be used to find more research
oc ozone depletion and CFC conserving technologies.

The tax

should initially be law, so it does not substantially harm the
competitive position of

u.s.

firms 1n relation to foreign firms.

S\.l·ch a tax will have a dual impact.
symbolic impact.

Regulatory action will set a global precedent

Which will demonstrate to
the CPO

proble~

First, it will have a

t~e

world that the U.S. believes ,that

i8 a major one.

The U.S. will then hopefully

exert Bome lever.age (albeit moral leverage) on other countries
to engage 1n blobslly coordinated activities to further gather
information on bzone depletion.
have a Eractical i.pact.

Secondly, implementing a tax will

Should further regulation be deemed

necessary, the U.S. will have the technological Ilj ump ll in employing
oonservative techniques.

Also, by examining the effect or the

tax on the economy, EPA could establish a framework for future
regulation.
The long run 8olution sbould be tempered by additional scien
tific study on ozone depletion.

If such study indicates that
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further regulation is needed. the tax SCQeme would probably
be inappropriate.

The tax rates necessary for higher levels

of control are qUlte high - leading to substantial transfer costs.
Under these circumstances, a tax Bcheme could unnecessarily cripple
the industry.

A permit auction scheme would a1a.o have the same

effect. for it too results in high transfer costs.
Therefore, a permit allocation scheme would be more appro
priate.

Such a. system can operate with little information. yet

achieve reductions at minimal Cost to

eFe

users.

In implementing

such a system, Care must be taken to remove the pcsBioi11ty of
politically manipulated permit allocations.

M1sallocated permits

can reeult 1n windfall profits for those receiving too many permits.
The regulation of CFes is exceptionally complex; it must

cover dozens of applications 1n thousands of firms thrOUghout
the U.S. economy.

Because of this diversity of use, the

eFe

problem provides prime tasting grounds for the use of economic
incentives as a meane of regulation.

Economic incentives have the

potential of not only reducing CFC emissions, but accomplishing
these reductions at minimal cost to society.

The only

16 EPAts inexperience with this type of regulation.

dr~wba.ck

Nevertheless,

economic incentives can provide a satisfactory solution to the
problem of CFC regulation.
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